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MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE FIRST DECADE
Stephen J. Friedman *

0

N June 2 I, 1966, Mr. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., delivered the majority opinion in Schmerber v. California.* That
opinion concluded his first decade on the Supreme Court of the
United States, an extraordinarily fruitful decade in the evolution
of constitutional doctrine. While it is too early to attempt a final
assessment of his contribution to the work of the Court, this anniversary provides an appropriate occasion for a review of that
contribution.
There has been some tendency to classify Mr. Justice Brennan
as a judicial liberal -which he assuredly is -reflecting the absolutist views of Mr. Justice Black -which he does not. Reading
his opinions of the last ten years, two pervading themes, one substantive and the other functional, are particularly a ~ p a r e n t . ~
First, he is deeply committed to the values of individual liberty
as embodied in the passive "right to be let alone," which he
views as in constant danger of being overreached by governmental action. These values are broader than the provisions of
the Bill of Rights, and for Mr. Justice Brennan they are guideposts in expanding the meaning of that list of specific guarantees.
Second, he believes that the constitutional framework accords to
the judiciary the primary task of protecting the integrity of the
individual and that the procedural aspects of the judicial process
are essential safeguards for substantive rights. These themes are
clearly reflected in the closing passage of a speech given by Mr.
Justice Brennan not long ago:
*Member of the New York Bar. A.B., Princeton, 1959; LL.B., Harvard, 1962.
Clerk to Mr. Justice Brennan, 1963 Term.
This artide is based on the first chapter of a collection of Mr. Justice Brennan's
opinions and speeches, edited by the author, which will be published by Atheneum
next year.
384 U.S. 757 (1966).
The limited scope of this artide precludes even a mention of many important
opinions of Mr. Justice Brennan, e.g., those in the areas of labor law, antitrust,
reapportionment, state libel laws and the first amendment, and the important
opinions of last Term considering the power of Congress to define the scope of the
fourteenth amendment.
Brennan, Constitzrtionat Adjudication, 40 NOTREDAMELAW.559, 569 (1965)
(footnote omitted).
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The constant for Americans, for our ancestors, for ourselves,
and we hope for future generations, is our commitment to the constitutional ideal 'of libertarian dignity protected through law.
Crises in prospect are creating, and will create, more and more
threats to the achievement of that ideal -more and more collisions of the individual with his government. The need for judicial
viglance in the service of that ideal will not lessen. It will
remain the business of judges to 'protect fundamental constitutional rights which will be threatened in ways not possibly envisaged by the Framers. Justices yet to sit, like their predecessors,
are destined to labor earnestly in that endeavor -we hope with
wisdom- to reconcile the complex realities of their times with
the principles which mark a free people. For as the nation moves
ever forward towards its goals of liberty and freedom . . . the
role of the Supreme Court will be ever the same -to justify Madison's faith that "independent tribunals of justice will consider
themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of [constitutional]
'rights."

A. "[A]

BROAD RIGHT TO INVIOLATE PERSONALITY"

Paul Freund has ,noted that "there are civil liberties which
point to insurgency and there are those which look to integrity."
While Mr. Justice Brennan has been by no means indifferent to
the former: his principal substantive concern has been with the
rights of privacy, the passive liberties broadly conceived.
His views are seen most clearly in opinions dealing with the
fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures and the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. While the language of these amendments speaks to procedural aspects of the criminal process, for Mr. Justice Brennan they
are expressions of the constitutionally fixed relationship between
the individual and the state. Thus, in speaking of the fourth
amendment he has said: "Like most of the Bill of Rights it was
not designed to be a shelter for criminals, but a basic protection
for everyone . . . . It is the individual's interest in privacy
which the Amendment protects . . . ." For him the fourth and
4Lopez V. United States, 373 U S . 427, 456 (1963) (dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Brennan)
P.FREUND,
ON UNDERSTANDING
THE SUPRIWE
COURT24 (1949).
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ; NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960) (dissenting opinion) ; see Ohio
ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (dissenting from the judgment of an
equally divided Court).

.
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fifth amendments are intertwined and together grant to the individual a broad right to be let alone in his person, home, and
effects. He is fond of quoting the passage from Boyd v. United
States in which Mr. Justice Bradley first noted that "the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other."
This view permeates his opinion for the Court in Malloy v.
H ~ g a n .I~n that case the Court reconsidered its prior holdings
that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was
not one of the "principles of a free government," loand therefore
was not applicable in its full scope to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Prior cases had considered that question in
the narrow context of the enforcement of criminal justice,ll and
it may well be that our broadly conceived federal privilege against
self-incrimination is not an essential element of a civilized criminal process. In Mr. Justice Brennan's view, however, it is less the
privilege than the notion that "[glovernments, state and federal,
are . . constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence
independently and freely secured7'l2 that is one of the "principles
of a free government." And in our constitutional system the privilege against self-incrimination is an essential protection for the
individual's right to be free from governmental interference.
Mr. Justice Brennan's analysis of the role of the fourth amendment is similar. His dissenting opinions in two cases decided in
the 1962 Term are particularly interesting in this regard. While
both cases arose from criminal prosecutions, his opinions speak to
broader values. I n Ker v. California l3 he insisted that police
officers could not, consistently with the fourth amendment, use a
passkey to enter the apartment of a suspected dope peddler, even
though they had reasonable cause to believe there was marijuana
within, without first announcing their presence and demanding
entry. Mr. Justice Brennan voiced his repugnance to the prospect
of the police breaking into anyone's home and a belief that the
restriction on police conduct would not be unduly burdensome.
The Ker dissent raised the spectre of "police state" activity
and arbitrary invasion of the privacy of the householder. In the
face of such conduct the guilty have as strong a claim to protec-

.

116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
378 U.S. I (1964).
'Old. at g, quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 632 (1S86).
See Mr. Justice Moody's opinion for the Court in Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78 (1908).
l2 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, 8 (1964).
l3 374 U.S. 23, 46 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
Heinonline - - 80 Harv. L. Rev.
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tion as the innocent. In Lopez v. United States l4 Mr. Justice
Brennan found a similar spectre when the claims of criminal law
enforcement were far stronger. Lopez's attempt to bribe a revenue agent to overlook his failure to pay the federal cabaret tax
was recorded by a device secreted on the agent's person, and the
recording so obtained was introduced in evidence at Lopez's trial
for attempted bribery. These facts make a strong case for admission of the recording. No significant interest of Lopez's was involved. The statements recorded were made to an agent of the
Government; thus, the case does not involve electronic eavesdropping on conversations of third parties. There was a clear risk that
the agent would report the conversation. Lopez's interest in
being able to contradict the agent's oral testimony at a subsequent
trial would seem to have only a slight claim to protection.
Yet Mr. Justice Brennan used the case as a platform for a dissenting opinion repudiating On Lee v. United States,15 in which a
federal agent was permitted to testify about a conversation he
overheard between the defendant and a police informer who
carried a hidden transmitter. Not surprisingly, the part of
Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion dealing with the facts of Lopez is
noticeably strained in its attempt to emphasize the similarity to
O n Lee.16 But the part dealing with the danger to individual
liberty created by electronic surveillance and with the applicability of the fourth amendment is a compelling statement of the
necessity of constitutional evolution to meet technological change.
Reviewing the history of the fourth and fifth amendments and
the Boyd case, he reaffirmed that together the "informing principle of both Amendments is nothing less than a comprehensive
right of personal liberty in the face of governmental intrusion." l7
Then he argued that O n Lee and its predecessors l8 had carved
out anomalous exceptions to the rule that wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping fall within the prohibitions of the fourth
amendment.19 The opinion reviewed the "terrifying facts" of the
--

-

l 4 373

--

U.S. 427 (1963).
l5 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
l 6 See 373 U.S. at 447-50.
l7 Id. at 455.
''See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (electronic eavesdropping) ; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U S . 438 (1928) (wiretapping).
l9 In Olmstead the Court held that the fourth amendment had not been violated because there had been no physical invasion of the defendant's home. 277 U.S.
at 464-65. In Goldman a preliminary trespass by the agents who later installed a
"detectaphone" in the office adjoining defendant's was held to have borne no maHeinonline - - 80 Harv. L. Rev.
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advances in electronic surveillance technology which give rise to
the possibility of abuse. He pointed out that while the existence
of an informer or an eavesdropper is "the kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak. . . . [As] soon as electronic
surveillance comes into play the risk changes crucially. There is
no security from that kind of eavesdropping, no way of mitigating the risk, and so not even a residuum of true privacy." 20
Finally, Mr. Justice Brennan7sportrait of privacy, begun with the
fourth and fifth amendments, is rounded out with the first. He
stated that electronic eavesdropping may infringe upon the first
amendment rights to free speech and "under certain circumstances,
to anonymity" 21 as well as the right to physical privacy. Thus he
feared that the inevitable effect of eavesdropping by the government would be to inhibit people from expressing their true feelings, even in "private."
The weakness of the Lopez dissent derives from the fact that
the precise question raised by the facts seems confined to the
criminal process. A majority opinion permitting the police to
record conversations with a person known by the speaker to be a
government agent -especially when the speaker attempts to
enlist the agent in the commission of a crime -could readily have
been written so as to carry no implied permission to eavesdrop on
the conversations of third parties. Homever, Mr. Justice Harlan's
opinion for the Court rests on the technical ground that there was
no unlawful invasion of Lopez's premises by the agent, a condition
upon the application of the fourth amendment with which Mr.
Justice Brennan may well have felt bound to take issue. On
balance, one would feel more comfortable with the dissenting
opinion if it had expressed the view that the fourth amendment
reaches such recordings, but that under the circumstances of this
case the "search" was not unreasonable.
This was the analysis adopted by Mr. Justice Brennan, writing
for the Court, in Schmerber v. Calif0rnia,2~a case which a t first
glance seems inconsistent with the thrust of ideas in his prior
opinions on the fifth amendment. I n fact, however, the opinion
is a good exposition of his view of the interrelationship between
the fourth and fifth amendments. After sustaining injuries in an
terial relation to the subsequent eavesdropping and therefore not to have introduced
a fourth amendment violation. 316 U.S. at 134-35.
*O 373 U.S. at 465-66.
21 Id. at 470.
384 U.S. 757 (1966).

'"
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automobile accident, Schmerber was taken to a hospital for treatment. He appeared to be drunk and was arrested at the hospital.
Over his protest on the advice of counsel, a blood sample was
taken at the hospital to determine the alcohol content of his
blood, and the results of the test were introduced a t his trial for
drunken driving. I n rejecting the argument that Schmerber's
privilege against self-incrimination had been infringed, Mr. Justice Brennan began with the proposition: "If the scope of the
privilege coincided with the complex of values it helps to protect,
we might be obliged to conclude that the privilege was violated." 23
But in the context of the privilege against self-incrimination, the
alcohol blood test is virtually indistinguishable from other well
accepted methods of police investigation such as fingerprints,
police line-ups, and voice and handwriting identification. While
the blood test was one way of proving "a charge against an accused out of his own mouth," 24 to extend the protection of the
fifth amendment to this situation would deny to the police many
of the traditional methods of investigation. Thus, the opinion concludes that the privilege in general reaches only "testimonial
compulsion" or "enforced communication." 2 V t then proceeds,
however, to rule that the withdrawal of blood is a search and
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. But in
contrast to Lopez the search in this case was held to be reasonable although made without a warrant. I n reaching this conclusion, Mr. Justice Brennan was much influenced by the facts
that the blood sample was taken by a doctor and that since
alcohol absorbed in the blood quickly dissipates, the test had to
be administered i m m e d i a t e l ~ . ~ ~
Mr. Justice Brennan's emphasis upon the passive liberties may
explain such an apparent anomaly as Ginzburg v. United States.27
Ginzburg was the publisher of two magazines, Eros and Liaison,
and a book entitled The Housewife's Handbook on Selective
Promiscuity. Each publication was advertised frankly to appeal
to sexual curiosity. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Brennan
assumed that these publications and the advertisements, each
standing alone, would not be obscene. He concluded, however,
23 Id.

at 762.
24 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U
.S. I, 8 (1964).
25 384 US.at 765.
26Cf.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.132 (1925) (possibility of fast escape
one reason for permitting search of moving vehicle without warrant).
27 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
Heinonline - - 80 Harv. L. Rev.
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that "the question of obscenity may include consideration of the
setting in which the publications were presented," 2s that "the
'leer of the sensualist7also permeates the advertising for the three
publications," 2%nd that "[m]here the purveyor's sole emphasis
is on the sexually provocative aspects of his publications, that
fact may be decisive in the determination of obscenity." 30 Finally, he found comfort in the fact that the proceeding did not
"necessarily" imply suppression of the materials involved.31
Ginzburg seems inconsistent with the series of Mr. Justice Brennan's opinions in the obscenity area, beginning with Roth v.
United
and ending with A Book Named "John Cleland's
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
decided
the same day as Ginzburg and according broad protection to material challenged as obscene.
The opinion in Ginzburg seems to focus only upon the personal
liberty of Ginzburg to publish what he pleases. Granting that
assumption, Mr. Justice Brennan's reasoning is impeccable: in
Roth the Court held that a government may punish distribution
of "obscene" literature; if it were Ginzburg's intention to sell
literature which the public mould accept as obscene, the case
presents much the same issues as an attempt to commit a crime,
and may be resolved in the same way. But the first amendment
embodies two quite different and often competing interests: the
right of an individual to speak his mind and the right of the public
to hear or read as it chooses. If we are concerned with the public's
right to read, then the judgments whether material appeals to
"prurient interest" and whether the book is "utterly without
redeeming social value" ought to be made without regard to
whether the publisher attempted to exceed the permissible bounds
of his personal liberty to print.
As in his dissent in Lopez, Mr. Justice Brennan has emphasized
the passive liberties in connection with the first amendment.34
This pattern is seen clearly in the series of cases dealing with the
power of state and federal investigating committees to inquire
Id. at 465.
*'Id. at 468.
30 Id. at 470.
31 Id. at 475.
32 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
33 383 u 8 . 413 (1966).
34 Cf.Roth v. United States, 354 US. 476 (1957).
28
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into the activities of alleged Communists. I n his first term on the
Court, he joined opinions holding that questions asked of witnesses
must be both pertinent to the investigation 3%nd clearly within
~ ~ these
the scope of the legislature's authorizing r e s o l ~ t i o n .But
decisions merely fixed basic conditions of the power to investigate,
postponing the difficult balancing of the competing interests of
personal liberty and the power of the state to investigate.
When these cases arose, in his early years on the Court, Mr.
Justice Brennan did not brush aside as unreal the dangers of
At the same time, he was acutely
international Comm~nism.~~
sensitive to the infringement on liberty of thought and expression
created by calling men to answer for their past political associations and to the drastic consequences of "exposure" as a Communist in those days of public hysteria. Thus, in balancing the
competing interests of state and citizen, Mr. Justice Brennan
was not a "valid
early came to the conclusion that "exp~sure'~
legislative interest of the State."
This was so, not because unlawful advocacy could not be punished, but because it could not
be punished in the procedural framework of a legislative investigation. Without the full panoply of procedural safeguards incident
to criminal justice, the range of the inquiry, and hence the infringement on liberty of thought and expression, would inevitably
be broader than in a criminal trial where inquiry must be confined
to prohibited activity. This is not to suggest that a legislature is
precluded, in Mr. Justice Brennan's view, from investigating for
the purpose of determining the need for legislation. But whether
the investigation is confined to that purpose is for him a question
for independent determination by the judiciary.39
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
"We are at a crucial hour and Americans of aU faiths have a common stake
in the outcome and are commendably alert, although for decades our cries of
danger fell upon deaf ears. But, certainly we need not panic . Americans of
all races and creeds have closed ranks against the godless foe. Whatever of treasure,
of time, of effort required to defeat him, we will provide, and gladly. But we cannot and must not doubt our strength to conserve, without the sacrifice of any, all
of the guarantees of justice and fair play and simple human dignity which have
made our land what it is." Unpublished Address of Mr. Justice Brennan Delivered
Before the Charitable Irish Society, March 17, 1954.
38 Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 106 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
3Q "True it is
. that any line other than a universal subordination of free
expression and association to the asserted interests of the State in investigation and
exposure will be difficult of definition; but this Court has rightly turned its back
35

36 Watkins

. ..

. .
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Moreover, to the extent that "exposure7' for its own sake becomes a form of punishment,4O the legislative investigation has a
flavor of the bill of attainder. This danger was made explicit in
Lerner v. Cesey,4l a case involving the dismissal under the New
York Security Risk Law of a New York City subway conductor
who pleaded the fifth amendment in an investigation of Communists in state bureaus or agencies. A majority of the Court
was satisfied with the state court's explanation that "because of
doubtful trust and reliability7'42 Lerner7s continued employment
would endanger national and state security. In dissent, Mr.
Justice Brennan pointed out that the state's determination of
Lerner's unreliability was not based on a finding that Lerner
was not closing the subway doors effectively, but upon a determination that he was disloyal. Furthermore, as applied to a subway
conductor, such a determination carries with it an indelible
stigma of suspected sabotage. He noted that "[tlhe people of
. [legislature]
New York . . have voiced through their
their determination that the stain of disloyalty shall not be impressed upon a state employee without fair procedures in which
the State carries the burden of proving specific charges by a fair
preponderance of evidence." 43 And by invoking the Security
Risk Law, he thought New York was publicly announcing that
it had requisite evidence of disloyalty, while at the same time
avoiding all of the procedural protections which should precede
such a finding.
In his views about the controlling importance of the broader
values of personal liberty underlying the specific provisions of
the Bill of Rights, Mr. Justice Brennan is not unlike Mr. Justice
Black. yet his philosophical approach to the protection of these
values is not the absolutism of Mr. Justice Black. Rather, he is
a balancer of interests and, more than any other member of the
liberal wing of the present Court, he has worked to create a coherent yet flexible analytical framework within which to isolate
the values to be protected.

.

..

on the alternative of universal subordination of protected interests, and we must
define rights in this area the best me can." Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 85 (1959).
40 Cf. BarenbIatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 166 (1959) (dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Brennan).
41 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
42 Id. at 472.
43 Id. at 479.

Heinonline - - 80 Harv. L. Rev.

15 1966-1967

16

B.

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

lyol. 80:1

" [TIHEPROCEDURES BY WHICH THE FACTS OF THE CASE ARE

DETERMINED ASSUME AN IMPORTANCE FULLY AS GREAT AS THE

VALIDITY OF THE SUBSTANTIVE RULE OF LAW TO BE APPLIED"

44

Mr. Justice Brennan's analysis of the relation between the prodedural context of legislative investigations and the substantive
rights involved suggests the second theme pervading his opinions:
the essential role of the judiciary and judicial procedures in protecting individual rights.
I t is fair, I think, to say that in Mr. Justice Brennan's view of
the constitutional scheme, the Supreme Court does not decide
constitutional issues solely because the process of litigation happens to throw them up for review. Although of course recognizing
t,hat.de power of the Court to decide is limited to litigated cases,
he believes that these most basic issues are litigated precisely
because, in the evolution of our constitutional system, the Court
has come to be Sewed as the appropriate institution for their
resolution. Thus, he is not hesitant to interpose the Court's
judgment in Lases raising questions of individual liberties and the
allocation of power among. governmental institutions: "I don't
think there can be any challenge to the proposition that the
ultimate protection of individual freedom is .found in court enforcement of [the Bill of Rightsl." 45
Moreover, it is apparent that Mr. Justice Brennan believes that
the judiciary, because of its independence and accumulated experience with the criminal process, is uniquely fitted for. the task.
The importance of an "independent magistrate" in protecting the
governed from the governing is a leitmotif that runs throughout
his opinions. In Abe2 v. United
Colonel Abel was arrested pursuant to an administrative warrant issued by an officer
of 'the I w g r a t i o n and ~aturalizationService. The hotel room
in which he was arrested was searched, and the evidence seized
was introduced at a subsequent trial for espionage. Mr. Justice
Brennan dissented from a judgment affirming Abel's conviction.
Pointing out that the search~wasbroader than one merely insuring the safety of the arresting officers and preventing Abel from
escaping, he thought it appropriate that there be "some inquiry
into the over-all protection given the individual by the totality of
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 530 (1958).
Brennan, supra note 3, at 567.
46 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
45
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the processes necessary to the arrest and the seizure." 47 Emphasizing that the arrest "was made totally without the intervention of an independent magistrate," either before or after the
arrest, he argued that without such a magistrate, "sitting under
the conditions of publicity that characterize our judicial institutions," 48 there is created precisely that "concentration of executive power over the privacy of the individual that the Fourth
Amendment was raised [to prevent] ."49
The "independent magistrate" theme has also appeared in his
opinions in cases where administrative activity has infringed on
first amendment rights. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan 50 called
into question the constitutionality of the procedures employed by
the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth,
which, although a creature of the state legislature, was composed
of private citizens. If the Commission decided that material distributed in the state was "objectionable" for sale to those under
eighteen years of age, it "recommended" to the distributor that it
be withdrawn from circulation. The distributor would often be
reminded of the Commission's duty to suggest prosecutions for
the sale of obscene matter to the state attorney general. Usually
a police officer would inquire whether the distributor had followed
the recommendation. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,
pointed out that the Commission's operation made the state's
criminal regulation of obscenity largely unnecessary: "In thus
obviating the need to employ criminal sanctions, the State has at
the same time eliminated the safeguards of the criminal process
. . creat[ing] hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater
than those that attend reliance upon the criminal law." 51 The
result was a system of prior restraints, he thought, which could be
"tolerated . . . only where it operated under judicial superintendence and assured an almost immediate judicial determination
of the validity of the restraint." 62 And in Manual Enterprises,
Inc. v. Day 63 Mr. Justice Brennan argued that a narrow construction ought to be given to the statute authorizing the Post
Office Department to withhold obscene matter from the mails,
since "the suggestion that Congress may constitutionally author-

.

Id. at 251.
Ibid.
Id. at 253.
'O372 US. 58 (1963).
Id. at 69-70.
2' Id. at 70; accord, Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S.51 (1965).
53 370 U.S. 478, $19 (1962) (concurring opinion).
47
'13
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ize any process [for determining whether matter is obscene] other
than a fully judicial one immediately raises the gravest doubts."
I n a somewhat different context, the strongest affirmation of
the role of the judiciary, in this case the federal courts, is to be
This case was concerned with the scope
found in Fay v.
of the doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies as a bar to the
federal habeas corpus power. Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion
represents an article of faith about the role of the federal judiciary
in protecting individual rights:
It is no accident that habeas corpus has time and again played a
central role in national crises, wherein the claims of order and of
liberty clash most acutely . . . Although in form the Great
[ilts root principal is
Writ is simply a mode of procedure .
that in a civilized society, government must always be accountable
to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment.

.

. ..

Related to Mr. Justice Brennan's commitment to the importance
of the judiciary in protecting individual liberty is his special concern with the impact of procedure on the protection of substantive
rights. This concern was present in the loyalty oath cases, but it
is most apparent in criminal cases, where the liberty of the accused
hangs in the balance. As a justice of the New Jersey Supreme
Court he dissented in a case in which a copy of the confession
given to the police had been denied to the defendantFc And in his
first term as a Supreme Court Justice he wrote the Court's opinion
in Jencks v. United States,s7 which established the right of a
criminal defendant in a federal court to examine reports which
have been given to the Government by witnesses who later testify
for the Government about events described in the reportF8
When rights other than liberty are at stake, Mr. Justice Brennan has been quick to appraise the effect of the procedural context upon those rights. I n Smith v. California 69 the proprietor of
a bookstore was convicted under a Los Angeles ordinance for
possessing obscene matter. The California courts interpreted the
ordinance as permitting conviction solely on the basis of possess4 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
55Zd. at 401-02.
State v. Tune, 13 N.J.203, 98 A.zd 881 (1953).
57 353 u s . 657 (1957).
58 Jencks was apparently grounded on the Supreme Court's supervisory power
over the federal courts. Congress enacted a sirniiar, but narrower rule in the Jencks
Act, 18 U.S.C. 3 3500 (Supp. 1966), in an attempt to limit the application of the
Jencks decision.
5 8 3 6 ~U S . 147 (1959).
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sion and held that the defendant's knowledge of the contents of
the book was not relevant. Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, ruled that the strict liability thus imposed violated the first
amendment. Pointing out that the effect of the ordinance was to
impose upon a bookseller the impossible burden of being familiar
with the contents of every book in his store in order to avoid a
violation, he concluded that the resulting pressure to refuse
books which had not been inspected had the effect of suppressing
books which are not obscene and that Roth v. United States 60
gave the states no license to suppress such books. Mr. Justice
Brennan conceded that strict liability might, in appropriate cases,
be accompanied by criminal sanctions, but not where it had the
effect of working a substantial restriction on freedom of the press.
A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas " involved the validity
of a Kansas statute under which a warrant was issued for the
seizure of written material which had been described in an information as obscene. The information identified the titles of fiftynine novels. In a forty-five minute ex parte hearing, the issuing
judge examined seven of the books, all of which carried the following imprint: "This is an original Night Stand book." He concluded
that the seven books appeared to be obscene, and issued a warrant
for the seizure of all the books identified in the information which
bore the same imprint. More than 1,700 copies of the books were
seized and at a later hearing were declared obscene. Before the
Supreme Court, the State of Kansas argued that obscene books,
like contraband, were not subject to the normal, strict standards
governing searches and seizures. As in Smith, Mr. Justice Brennan thought that the prior restraint created by removing the
books from circulation without an adversary hearing on their
obscenity outweighed considerations of traditional criminal invesigation techniques, and he found the procedure inadequate
to protect activity within the first amendment.
When conduct which may be protected by the Bill of Rights is
the subject of a nonjudicial proceeding, Mr. Justice Brennan has
insisted that similar standards of procedural fairness be observed. Thus he dissented in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,B2in
which the majority found no constitutional defect when the
identification badge of a civilian cafeteria worker in a defense
installation was revoked by the Naval Security Officer on the

-

60354 U.S. 476 (1957).
378 US. 205 (1964).
6z367 US. 886 (1961).
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ground that she was a security risk, although she was given no
idea of the nature of the charges against her and no opportunity
to defend against them. For Mr. Justice Brennan the absence of
these fundamental elements of procedural fairness was a denial
of due process of law. Here, as in the legislative investigation
cases, he felt that the fact that she was characterized as a security
risk "makes this particularly a case where procedural requirements of fairness are essential." s3
I n cases involving nonjudicial proceedings, Mr. Justice Brennan has given special attention to the effect of the allocation of
the burden of proof on first amendment rights. This concern
grows out of an analogy, largely unexpressed in his opinions, between the liberty of a defendant at stake in a criminal trial and
other rights at issue in administrative proceedings. Speiser v.
Randall 64 concerned a special exemption for veterans from the
California property tax. Veterans were required to file a request
for the exemption each year, accompanied by the affirmation: "I
do not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United
States or the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means, nor advocate the support of a foreign government
against the United States in event of hostilities." 65 Under California law the affirmation was merely evidence of the facts asserted, the truth of which was a condition of the exemption. The
burden of establishing those facts before the tax assessor rested
with the taxpayer, and if the assessor denied the exemption, the
burden remained with the taxpayer to challenge the denial before
a reviewing court. Drawing the analogy to criminal proceedings,
Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out that: 66

...

There is always in litigation a margin of error
which both
parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an
interest of transcending value- as a criminal defendant his liberty- this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of
placing on the other party the burden of producing a sufficiency of
proof in the first instance, and of persuading the factfinder at the
conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
Id. at 901.
357 u s . 513 (1958).
65357 U.S. at 515. The California Supreme Court construed the exemption as
being denied only to those engaging in activity which could be punished consistently
with the first amendment, applying the standards set forth in Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles,
48 Cal. 2d 419, 328, 438-40, 311 P.2d 508, 513, 519-20 (1957).
66 357 US. at 525-26.
6S
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. . . . Where the transcendent value of speech is involved, due
process certainly requires in the circumstances of this case that
the State bear the burden of persuasion to show that the appellants engaged in criminal speech.
This concern was repeated three years later in a dissenting
opinion filed in Konigsberg v. State Bar of C a l i f o r n i ~ .Under
~~
the bar admission procedure in California, the applicant has the
burden of showing "that he is possessed of good moral character,
of removing any and all reasonable suspicion of moral unfitness,
and that he is entitled to the high regard and confidence of the
public." 68 One of the statutory criteria for lack of good moral
character is advocacy of the overthrow of the government of the
United States or California by force or violence. The California
Committee of Bar Examiners refused to certify Konigsberg because of his repeated refusal to answer questions about his past
or present membership in the Communist Party. Mr. Justice
Brennan, quoting Justice Traynor's dissent in the California
Supreme Courtjcgfelt that "[tlhe possibility of inquiry into . . .
[applicants'] speech, the heavy burden upon them to establish its
innocence, and the evil repercussions of inquiry despite innocence,
would constrain them to speak their minds so noncommittally
that no one could ever mistake their innocuous words for advocacy." 70 Similarly, in Freedman v. Maryland,7l he wrote an
opinion for the Court declaring unconstitutional a system of prior
censorship of motion pictures because, inter alia, if a license to
exhibit the film were denied by the censors, the exhibitor had the
burden of proof in attacking the denial before a court.
This concern with procedural issues plays a uniquely substantive role in Mr. Justice Brennan's jurisprudence. It goes far beyond the concern for elemental fairness expressed in his dissenting opinion in Cafeteria Workers v. ilIcElroy. The procedures of
the criminal process upon which he has drawn so heavily do more
than simply attempt to create an equal balance between the state
and the accused. They embody the presumption of innocence.
Just as the liberty of the defendant is thus "hedged about with
the procedural safeguards of the criminal process," 72 SO, for Mr.
366 U.S. 36, 80 (1961).
Id. at 38.
BgKonigsberg v. State Bar of California, 52 Cal. 2d 769, 777, 344 P.2d 777,
782 (1959).
"366 U S . at 81.
380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
72Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
07
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Justice Brennan, must be the other attributes of individual freedom. The notion that "First Amendment Freedoms need breathing space to survive" 73 is an expression of the need for creating
procedural safeguards to insure that the state shows clearly
that putatively protected conduct should be punished in a given
case. It is in this area, the relation between procedural safeguards and the attributes of individual liberty, that Mr. Justice
Brennan has made a unique contribution to the work of the
Court. He has turned to matters of procedure, not to avoid
adjudication, but to insure that the Court is called upon to balance
competing interests of state and citizen only when the judgment that conduct should be punished has been made in a setting which is designed to discriminate between protected and
unprotected activity.
I began this review by saying that it was too early in his career
to attempt a final assessment of Mr. Justice Brennan's contribution to the work of the Court. That is certainly true. Yet at
the end of his first decade of service, it is plain that he has been
true to his vision of a society in which personal liberty is sacred.
He has expressed that vision as 74

. . . the age-old dream for recognition of the inherent dignity and
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family, for in that recognition is indeed the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. The dream, though always
old, is never old, like the Poor Old Woman in Yeats' play. "Did
you see an old woman going down the path?" asked Bridget. "I
did not," replied Patrick, who had come into the house just after
the old woman left it, "but I saw a young girl and she had the
walk of a queen."
Button, 371 U.S.415, 433 (1963).
Mr. Justice Brennan, Louis Marshall Award Dinner of the Jewish
Theological Seminary of America, New York City, November IS, 1964.
73 NAACP V.
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